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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
John D. Alvin, Ph.D, a tenured professor at the 
University of Pittsburgh ("UPitt" or "the University"), started 
and operated two successful pharmaceutical companies, 
Pharmakon, Inc. ("PKI") and Pharmakon, R&D ("PRD"), 
which competed with university-related commercial 
activities. He brought this civil rights action alleging that 
the University contrived to deny him the benefits that 
inhere in a tenured position to punish him for his 
entrepeneurial activity. Alvin alleges that he was deprived of 
expected pay increases, access to work with graduate 
students, laboratories, faculty functions, and other faculty 
privileges, and that his reputation was damaged in the 
process. He also contends that his tenure in the UPitt 
Pharmacology Department was improperly severed and that 
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he was transferred to a tenured position in the Dental 
School without his consent. 
 
Resolution of this appeal centers on Alvin's compliance 
with the University's grievance process. Alvin contends that 
the procedures failed him. He proffers evidence of extensive 
correspondence between himself and several members of 
the University's administration. He claims that he followed 
the grievance procedure laid out in the faculty handbook, 
but that he was never afforded a hearing in which he could 
defend himself and explain both the propriety of his 
conduct and the unjustness of the deprivations he alleges 
that he suffered. The gravamen of Alvin's suit is therefore 
that he was deprived of his Fourteenth Amendment right in 
the property of his tenure without due process of law. 
Named as defendants were UPitt, Dr. Jon B. Suzuki, Dean 
of UPitt's School of Dental Medicine, and two health care 
providers connected with the University--the University of 
Pittsburgh Medical Center and Central Laboratory Services, 
Inc. Alvin seeks damages and injunctive relief under 42 
U.S.C. S 1983 and Pennsylvania state law. 
 
The District Court granted summary judgment for the 
defendants on Alvin's S 1983 claim, concluding that he had 
not demonstrated that he had been deprived of a property 
interest, and dismissed the pendent state claims without 
prejudice. The District Court's opinion focused largely on 
the question whether the alleged incidents comprised such 
a significant erosion of the incidents of his tenure that he 
was deprived of a property interest. We do not reach this 
difficult (and interesting) question, however, because, 
whether or not Alvin has alleged a property deprivation, he 
has failed to adduce evidence that the defendants infringed 
upon whatever property right he possessed without due 
process of law. 
 
A careful examination of the correspondence 
demonstrates that, although he sent a battery of letters and 
complaints to several members of the UPitt faculty and 
administration, he did not comply with the two-step 
grievance procedure laid out in the faculty handbook, a 
procedure that, if complied with, would appear to provide 
due process. Furthermore, with respect to some of Alvin's 
claims--that he was deprived of secretarial support, that 
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his yearly evaluations were conducted unfairly, and that his 
tenure was transferred--he adduced no evidence that he 
attempted to use the grievance procedure to resolve them. 
Finally, Alvin claims that pre-termination notice and a 
hearing was required prior to the transfer of his tenure. The 
context of that transfer--it was a routine matter as part of 
a policy decision to transfer the entire faculty-- 
demonstrates that notice and a hearing were not required. 
In sum, we will affirm the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment on all aspects of the S 1983 claim. 
 
PKI also sued the same defendants, claiming interference 
with contractual relations, unfair competition, violations of 
the Lanham Act, and civil conspiracy. After the plaintiffs 
attempted both to amend the complaint and to add PRD as 
a party plaintiff, the District Court dismissed the PKI 
complaint with prejudice and denied the motion to join PRD 
despite the absence of either bad faith in the efforts to 
amend or prejudice to the defendants. The plaintiffs also 
appealed this order. Given the liberal amendment 
provisions of Rule 15, the amendment should have been 
allowed. Because we conclude that the District Court 
abused its discretion in dismissing PKI's claims with 
prejudice and refusing to add PRD as a party, we will 
vacate the judgment and remand for consideration of those 
claims. 
 
I. Facts 
 
A. Background and Alleged Deprivations 
 
In 1978, after three years of teaching and research at 
UPitt's School of Pharmacy ("SPharm"), Alvin, a pharmacist 
and pharmaceutical researcher, was offered, and accepted, 
a tenured position as an Associate Professor of 
Pharmacology at SPharm. In 1982, he organized PKI, a 
commercial venture intended to provide specialty drug 
services and high-tech drug research to medical 
organizations, the government, and the private sector. In 
1983, PKI, with the knowledge of the Dean of SPharm, 
rented space from UPitt. 
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According to Alvin, PKI flourished, and its success 
threatened others in the University-related medical world, 
specifically the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center 
("UPMC"), a non-profit corporation that operates the 
teaching hospital, and Central Laboratory Services, Inc. 
("CLSI"), a non-profit corporation that provides laboratory 
services to UPMC. UPMC shares administrators with UPitt. 
Alvin alleges that, starting in 1984, UPMC and CLSI began 
to pressure UPitt to eliminate or purchase PKI. However, 
when UPitt presented a takeover package to Alvin and PKI, 
they were not interested. 
 
Alvin contends that throughout the late 1980s and 90s, 
UPMC and CLSI provided the same services as PKI and 
solicited PKI's existing and prospective customer base. He 
contends that UPitt intentionally contacted PKI's customers 
and misrepresented the licensed status of PKI. According to 
Alvin, this threatened PKI's existence, and led him in the 
fall of 1991 to create PRD, a partnership between himself 
and the Clinical Pathology Facility ("CPF "). PKI indisputedly 
sold and leased equipment to CPF and PRD, but according 
to Alvin it continued to exist as a separate entity 
throughout the early 90s. 
 
Alvin alleges that during the same time period, UPitt 
deprived him of many of the benefits that inhere in tenure 
because of his involvement with PKI and PRD. He avers 
that from 1991 to 1995 he was denied a salary increase 
because of his refusal to discontinue his commercial 
ventures. He claims that from 1992 on, his use of research 
facilities and laboratories was cut off and the defendants 
made research difficult and refused to allow him to bring 
foreign exchange scholars to work on his projects. He 
contends that he was deprived of administrative services 
and secretarial support. He submits that his yearly 
evaluations were conducted unfairly and improperly and 
that the University refused to process his conflict of interest 
statements, thwarting his ability to submit grant 
applications. He claims that he was selectively excluded 
from departmental meetings, UPitt functions, departmental 
assignments and duties, and he alleges that he was 
obstructed in his ability to publish his research and 
conduct collaborative research. It is undisputed that in 
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1995, Suzuki, the Dean of UPitt's SDM, ordered Alvin to 
cease all research projects, on the ground that he was 
researching in violation of UPitt's policy on conflict of 
interest. However, according to Alvin, Suzuki refused to 
reveal the basis for this conflict of interest charge. 
 
Alvin asserts that none of these deprivations were 
warranted, but rather were motivated by the threat he 
posed the University medical organizations and UPitt's 
desire to pressure him into allowing it to take over PKI and 
PRD. The factual record regarding these claims was not 
developed for this appeal because the defendants have not 
presented evidence contradicting Alvin's allegations 
regarding what happened. Instead, they argued that"even 
if all of the adverse personnel actions alleged in the 
Complaint occurred in the manner claimed by Alvin, these 
adverse personnel actions do not, as a matter of law, 
amount to deprivations of property rights under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Appellee's 
Br. at 11. Therefore, for the purposes of this appeal, we 
assume all of Alvin's allegations regarding the deprivations 
to be true. 
 
B. The Faculty Grievance Procedure and Alvin's 
       Correspondence 
 
The facts that we do examine are those regarding the 
faculty grievance procedure and the evidence of the extent 
to which Alvin attempted to avail himself of the University 
processes. The University's 1988 Handbook explains the 
two-step "Faculty Grievance Procedure." Thefirst step, 
entitled the "Informal Process," requires the professor to 
contact the chair of the Tenure and Academic Freedom 
Committee ("TAFC") for an informal investigation. 
Thereafter, the TAFC mediator should attempt to resolve 
the complaint: "[e]very effort will be made to achieve a 
satisfactory resolution within two weeks of the initial 
contact with the aggrieved person." The mediator is then 
supposed to write a letter to the faculty member with 
"whatever findings and recommendations seem appropriate 
under the circumstances." 
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The second step, the "Formal Process," is available if the 
informal process does not resolve the dispute. The Faculty 
Handbook provides that 
 
       [i]n the event that the informal investigation and 
       mediation process does not resolve the grievance 
       dispute, the aggrieved faculty member may submit to 
       the Provost a written statement of the grievance and 
       the circumstances out of which it arose. This written 
       statement will be the complaint that will initiate the 
       formal grievance procedure described below, and must 
       be submitted within 30 days of receipt of the TAFC 
       letter. 
 
The formal process provides for a grievance panel which 
reviews the case and makes recommendations to the 
Provost. The faculty member may present documents, 
evidence, testimony, and retain counsel. 
 
Alvin contends that he attempted to use the University's 
procedures. What follows is a summary, in the light most 
favorable to Alvin, of pertinent parts of his correspondence 
--those letters and communications, which, according to 
him, demonstrate his attempt to pursue the grievance 
procedure: 
 
1. On May 17, 1990, Alvin wrote to Dr. Robert W. Koch, 
Executive Associate Dean of the School of Dental Medicine, 
complaining about the reallocation of laboratory space and 
requesting that he be informed "as quickly as possible of 
the formal appeals procedures that are available to me and 
any interested colleagues both within and outside of the 
School of Dental Medicine." 
 
2. On June 6, 1990, Alvin again wrote to Koch, referring 
in the letter to a meeting about the reallocation of 
laboratory space a few weeks earlier. He expressed 
dissatisfaction with the meeting, and asked again if Koch 
would "please inform [him] of the formal appeals 
procedures available to [him] within and outside the School 
of Dental Medicine." 
 
3. Some time in 1991, Alvin met with Dr. Sanford Golin 
of the TAFC. Golin, according to Alvin, agreed to initiate the 
grievance procedure regarding the use of research facilities 
and equipment for post-doctoral exchange students. 
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4. On July 23, 1991, Alvin wrote Provost Donald 
Henderson about a number of issues, addressing several 
disagreements he had with University policies as well as 
complaints about how the University had treated him, but 
he did not mention a formal appeal process or grievance. 
 
5. On February 23, 1992, Alvin wrote to Suzuki, stating 
that he planned to appeal his decision regarding lab space 
"through whatever procedures are available both within and 
without the School of Dental Medicine." 
 
6. On June 15, 1992, Alvin wrote to Regis Vollmer, the 
Chairman of the Department of Pharmacology, complaining 
of his treatment and asking, among other things:"Lacking 
an information gathering process in advance, what is the 
appeal process post facto? Why have my requests for appeal 
gone unattended since February?" 
 
7. On June 25, 1992, Suzuki wrote to Alvin, stating 
that: "I have received your appeal of my decision that you 
vacate the two labs presently assigned to you. Please be 
advised that your request is denied based on the School of 
Dental Medicine's policy of assigning space based on 
research productivity and need." On July 7, 1992, Alvin 
wrote to Suzuki again, asking about an interpretation of 
Suzuki's letter ("Does this mean my request for an appeal 
is denied or that my appeal based on the issues is 
denied?"), and urging him to reconsider. 
 
8. On September 7, 1992, Alvin wrote to UPitt 
Chancellor Dennis O'Connor. The letter began, "I am 
contacting you in the hope that I have not reached the 
terminus in administrative review on the matters described 
below. My appeals to the chairman of my department, the 
dean of my school, and the provost have gone unanswered." 
The letter went on to detail several of the complaints that 
form the basis of this claim. 
 
9. On September 16 and September 21, 1992, Alvin 
wrote to Dr. James Holland, President of the University 
Senate, detailing his complaints and stating that he was 
"formally submitting his grievance." Along with these letters 
he sent "A Grievance Concerning Revocation of Research 
Facilities." 
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10. In October 1992, Alvin met with Dr. Tobias, the 
Chair of the TAFC. Tobias told him that the grievance 
process would go forward and that Alvin would have an 
opportunity to present evidence and his point of view: 
 
       Dr. Tobias eventually met with me, in October, 1992. 
       Dr. Tobias assured me that he would conduct the 
       grievance process, that he would give me the 
       opportunity to submit relevant information, and that 
       he would conduct a grievance resolution meeting with 
       me and Dr. Suzuki (or Dr. Vollmer, my Chairman). 
       However, when a meeting (the only one I have been 
       able to discover) was held, I was not invited to it, was 
       not told it was going to take place, and was not given 
       the opportunity to submit information. 
 
11. In November 1992, Alvin told Vollmer that he was 
worried that the TAFC committee was not acting on his 
case. Vollmer told him that Tobias had confidentially 
contacted Vollmer, and that Vollmer was not sure if the 
panel would be meeting with him. Vollmer told Alvin that 
UPitt attorneys were on the case. 
 
12. On December 22, 1992, Tobias and Golin wrote to 
Alvin on behalf of the TAFC, informing him that they had 
rejected his claim, and that he could pursue an appeal by 
following the second, formal step laid out in the Faculty 
Handbook. 
 
Alvin admits that after this series of correspondence, he 
did not pursue any further review by any faculty 
committee. The record also reflects that he failed to present 
evidence suggesting that he ever attempted to trigger a 
grievance process regarding his allegations (1) that he was 
denied secretarial support; (2) that he was treated unfairly 
in connection with his grant proposal; (3) that his 1993-94 
or 1994-95 annual review was biased; and (4) that his 
transfer from the School of Dental Medicine to the School 
of Pharmacy was improper. 
 
C. The Conflict of Interest Claim 
 
Alvin separately alleges that he was deprived procedural 
due process when the University refused to respond to his 
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complaints that Suzuki had unfairly ordered him to stop all 
research projects. The evidence regarding this claim 
establishes that Alvin filled out forms entitled"Conflict of 
Interest Disclosure Statements," which are intended to 
reveal any conflicts a faculty member may have in their 
research. On May 17, 1995, Suzuki wrote to Alvin, stating 
that he would not approve Alvin's conflict of interest 
statements. He wrote that there was an apparent conflict of 
interest because of Alvin's involvement with PKI (but did 
not detail its nature) and wrote that it was Alvin's burden 
to prove that his PKI activities did not create a conflict with 
his obligations to the University. He directed Alvin to "not 
participate in any research or project without the express 
written approval of Dr. Paul Moore, Director of Research, 
who shall certify that he has examined the proposed 
activity [to] determine whether there is in fact any conflict 
of interest between the University and your interests in 
Pharmakon." Suzuki also informed Alvin that he could 
appeal the decision. 
 
Alvin then wrote to the Provost, Dr. James Maher, to 
complain. The record reflects that, during 1995, Maher and 
Alvin corresponded frequently regarding these claims. 
Maher told Alvin that a Conflict of Interest Committee had 
been established to review Suzuki's decision. In October 
1995, the Vice Provost wrote Alvin that he could supply 
additional information, and that he should write to the 
committee stating his position. Alvin responded that he 
could not state his position fully without knowing what 
Suzuki had said, and that he had no faith in the University 
process. On November 29, 1995, the Vice Provost wrote to 
Alvin explaining Suzuki's justification, and stating that "I 
hope that this information has been helpful to you and that 
we will be able to begin deliberations to have a 
recommendation to the Provost in short order." 
 
On February 15, 1996, Alvin wrote the Provost, stating 
that 
 
       [m]atters pertaining to the conflict of interest issues 
       which have been raised about me within the University 
       of Pittsburgh are involved in my pending litigation 
       against the University and others. I believe that it is 
       necessary and appropriate to follow the litigation path, 
 
                                10 
  
       in part because of my inability to obtain full, fair and 
       due process within the University. 
 
He added that given his experience with UPitt, he was left 
with "no choice but to continue to attempt to protect myself 
and obtain my legitimate rights through the court action." 
 
D. The Transfer of Tenure 
 
In 1987, UPitt developed a plan to transfer the entire 
pharmacology faculty to UPitt's School of Dental Medicine, 
leaving SPharm intact, but without faculty. According to 
University records, on July 1, 1987, Alvin's tenure and 
primary appointment in SPharm was terminated and 
transferred to the Department of Pharmacology of the 
School of Dental Medicine ("SDM"). On September 2, UPitt 
wrote to Alvin, informing him that he had been, or would be 
(the letter is ambiguous) transferred from SPharm to the 
position of tenured Associate Professor of Physiology and 
Pharmacology in the SDM, and asking for his approval. 
Alvin did not sign this letter as requested, or otherwise 
approve of or consent to the transfer. All other members of 
the pharmacology faculty agreed to the transfer. 
 
II. Procedural History 
 
Alvin and PKI filed suit against CLSI, UPitt, and UPMC in 
the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, 
Pennsylvania. Alvin sued under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 and 
Pennsylvania state law. The original complaint by PKI 
included claims for unfair competition, violation of the 
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1125, and civil conspiracy. The 
defendants removed to the District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania. 
 
The defendants moved to dismiss PKI's claim on the 
ground that PKI was not a real party in interest. They 
contended that PKI was essentially suing as a partner of 
PRD, but lacked standing to do so. This argument 
persuaded the District Court, which, in a hearing on 
August 15, dismissed (without prejudice) all claims 
concerning PKI because it concluded that PKI was"not a 
proper party . . . under the allegations that have been 
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made" in the original complaint. The court stated to 
Appellant's Counsel: "You can amend your complaint . . . . 
But not substitute a party without leave of court." The 
court made clear it was open only to an amendment that 
explained the specific harm suffered by PKI, stating that 
there "is going to be no amended complaint as to Dr. Alvin's 
complaint." However, the written order that followed stated 
"[t]he motion of defendants to dismiss the claims asserted 
by plaintiff . . . (PKI) is granted without prejudice to the 
right of plaintiffs, John D. Alvin and Pharmakon, Inc., to 
file an amended complaint." PKI and Alvin represent that 
the court's pronouncements led them to believe that they 
could amend their complaint in more ways than one, and 
they did so. 
 
Alvin and PKI filed an amended complaint which detailed 
how PKI had been separately harmed, and which joined 
PRD as a new plaintiff. UPitt moved for dismissal, or in the 
alternative, to strike the amended complaint. Alvin and PKI 
then moved for leave to amend the complaint (in the form 
of the amended complaint previously filed), and for leave to 
join PRD as a party. On November 12, the District Court 
granted the motion to strike the Amended Complaint, 
dismissed PKI's original claims with prejudice, and denied 
the Motion to Amend and to join PRD. When counsel 
inquired as to whether PKI's amended complaint was legally 
adequate, the District Court announced "I'm not making 
any ruling; [the plaintiffs] did not comply with my order. 
The complaint added a party. I didn't give leave to add a 
party. I'm striking that amended complaint in its entirety 
. . . [f]or that reason." 
 
The District Court then granted summary judgment for 
Suzuki on Alvin's S 1983 claims, concluding even if all he 
alleged were true, he would not have been deprived of a 
property interest. The court also dismissed the state claims 
without prejudice. This appeal followed, in which the 
plaintiffs challenge the District Court's ruling on Alvin's 
S 1983 claims, the refusal to grant leave to amend the PKI 
complaint and add PRD, and the resulting dismissal. We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
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III. The Procedural Due Process Claims 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution forbids a 
state from depriving persons of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV,S 1. 
UPitt is a state actor. See Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 
552 F.2d 948, 955-65 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc). When a 
plaintiff sues under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 for a state actor's 
failure to provide procedural due process, we employ the 
"familiar two-stage analysis," Robb v. City of Philadelphia, 
733 F.2d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 1984), inquiring (1) whether "the 
asserted individual interests are encompassed within the 
fourteenth amendment's protection of `life, liberty, or 
property' "; and (2) whether the procedures available 
provided the plaintiff with "due process of law." 
 
A. Failure to Follow Processes 
 
In order to state a claim for failure to provide due 
process, a plaintiff must have taken advantage of the 
processes that are available to him or her, unless those 
processes are unavailable or patently inadequate."[A] state 
cannot be held to have violated due process requirements 
when it has made procedural protection available and the 
plaintiff has simply refused to avail himself of them." 
Dusanek v. Hannon, 677 F.2d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1982); see 
also Bohn v. County of Dakota, 772 F.2d 1433, 1441 (8th 
Cir. 1985). A due process violation "is not complete when 
the deprivation occurs; it is not complete unless and until 
the State fails to provide due process." Zinermon v. Burch, 
494 U.S. 113, 126 (1990). If there is a process on the books 
that appears to provide due process, the plaintiff cannot 
skip that process and use the federal courts as a means to 
get back what he wants. See McDaniels v. Flick , 59 F.3d 
446, 460 (3d Cir. 1995); Dwyer v. Regan, 777 F.2d 825, 
834-35 (2d Cir. 1985), modified on other grounds, 793 F.2d 
457 (2d Cir. 1986); Riggins v. Board of Regents , 790 F.2d 
707, 711-12 (8th Cir. 1986). 
 
This requirement is to be distinguished from exhaustion 
requirements that exist in other contexts. Alvin appears to 
conflate the two, and contends, as an alternative to his 
claim that he attempted to use the available procedures, 
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that he need not go through the processes available 
because of the general rule there is no exhaustion 
requirement for 42 U.S.C. S 1983 claims. See Patsy v. 
Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982); Hohe 
v. Casey, 956 F.2d 399, 408 (3d Cir. 1992). However, 
exhaustion simpliciter is analytically distinct from the 
requirement that the harm alleged has occurred. Under the 
jurisprudence, a procedural due process violation cannot 
have occurred when the governmental actor provides 
apparently adequate procedural remedies and the plaintiff 
has not availed himself of those remedies. See Zinermon, 
494 U.S. at 126. Applying these principles to this case, we 
conclude that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable 
to Alvin, he did not avail himself of the procedures provided 
by the University because he did not follow the University 
regulations regarding the use of the grievance procedure. 
 
Alvin contends that he triggered the first (informal) step 
in the grievance procedure by his early letters, and the 
formal step by his written grievance. According to Alvin, the 
informal process was triggered by his first meeting with Dr. 
Golin in 1991 (item #31), over a year prior to any review on 
the part of the University. The problem with this contention 
is that Golin was not the chair of the TAFC, which is the 
party an aggrieved faculty member is supposed to contact 
according to the faculty handbook. See supra Section I.B. 
Alvin first contacted Tobias, who was the chair of the TAFC, 
in October 1992 (item #10). After meeting Tobias, the TAFC 
met and discussed the case, and Alvin learned of the 
results of this informal proceeding in December 1992 (item 
#12). This two-month delay is much greater than the two- 
week time period set forth in the handbook as the time 
period within which the informal process is supposed to 
take. The handbook does not promise a two-week 
turnaround; rather, it merely states that "every effort will be 
made" to satisfactorily resolve the dispute within two 
weeks. Alvin complained about the inordinate delay, but he 
never actually triggered the formal process by submitting a 
formal grievance letter to the Provost. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We refer in this and the next two paragraphs to the itemization in 
supra Section I.B. 
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Alvin's 1991 letter to Provost Henderson (item #4) was 
informal, and did not refer to the Faculty Grievance 
Procedure. But even if that letter were intended to trigger 
the formal procedures, the Provost cannot be expected to 
have guessed at its purpose. Alvin's two letters to Dr. Koch 
(items #1 & 2), while plaintive, do not purport to be 
grievances, but rather constitute efforts to learn about the 
grievance procedure, and both were sent prior to his initial 
contact with Golin. The letter to Suzuki (item #5) and the 
letter to his Department Chair, Dr. Volmer (item #6), are 
both clearly outside the process laid out in the Handbook. 
 
Alvin's strongest argument derives from the letters to 
Chancellor O'Connor (item #8) and Dr. Holland, University 
Senate President (item #9). In both letters, arguably after a 
futile effort to trigger the informal process (his alleged 
conversation with Golin), Alvin laid out his complaint; the 
latter letter included a statement that he was "formally 
submitting" his grievance, and was accompanied by a 
formal grievance. But these letters were sent to the wrong 
officials in the University. The President of the University 
Senate is not the Provost. Furthermore, the letter to 
Holland did not state that Alvin had attempted to use the 
informal process. Though these may seem like minor 
mistakes, the burden is on the aggrieved faculty member to 
make the complaint in the right manner to the right 
individual before he can claim that the process has failed 
him. 
 
Dr. Holland took the letter to be a request for initiation 
of the informal processes (there was no suggestion in the 
letter that Alvin had therefore attempted to use the informal 
process), and shortly thereafter, the informal process 
began. After the TAFC rejected Alvin's claims, Alvin was 
informed by the December 22 letter that he could pursue 
the formal process (item #12). When asked during a 
deposition, Alvin admitted that he did not trigger the formal 
process after December 22: 
 
       Q: At any time after December 22, 1992, did youfile a 
       formal complaint with the Provost under the Second 
       Step Formal Process arising out of the matters 
       discussed in this December 22 letter? 
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       A: Not after this letter. 
 
       Q: Why not? 
 
       A: I had already done it . . . . 
 
(1378). He goes on to detail his previous efforts to engage 
his department and the Provost's office. While we are not 
unsympathetic to Alvin's apparent misunderstanding of the 
terms of the faculty grievance handbook, our sentiments do 
not change the requirement that one use the procedures 
available, which Alvin did not do. 
 
In sum, Alvin simply did not follow the prescribed 
processes in the Faculty Handbook. His battery of letters to 
the right people in the wrong manner, and the wrong 
people in the right manner, does not allow him to sustain 
a claim that the procedures he did not use were 
constitutionally flawed.2 Alvin may understandably have felt 
that he did all that he could, and that any other efforts 
would be useless. In fact, although he wrote far more than 
he needed to in one sense, he ultimately wrote one letter 
too little (and too late). If Alvin had (1) attempted to use the 
informal process and then (2) after a few weeks had passed 
without any result on the informal process, written a formal 
grievance to the Provost, stating that the informal process 
had failed, he could state a claim (presuming that the 
process failed even after this effort). But even reading the 
record in the light most favorable to Alvin, there is simply 
insufficient evidence supporting his claim that he followed 
through and triggered the second, formal step of the 
procedure on any of the claims.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In his supplemental brief requested by this panel, Alvin also suggests 
that he did not have to use these procedures, noting that Dr. Detre, 
Senior Vice Chancellor, testified that the correct appeals process is 
"[d]epartmental chairman to the dean, from the dean to me, from me to 
the provost, from the provost to the chancellor of the University." 
However, Alvin never suggested that he did not need to use the channels 
provided in the Faculty Handbook prior to the supplemental briefs to the 
panel after oral argument. Therefore, this argument is waived. See Harris 
v. City of Philadelphia, 35 F.3d 840, 845 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that 
issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered). 
3. We also note that Alvin has not framed this case in the context of 
cases involving inordinate delay, and neither party briefed those cases 
nor discussed their framework at oral argument. Cf. FDIC v. Mallen, 486 
U.S. 230, 242 (1988) (setting forth the framework for delay claims). 
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B. Futility 
 
In the alternative, Alvin argues that he did not need to 
trigger the formal process correctly, because it was clear 
that it would be constitutionally inadequate, in that the 
University would be entirely unresponsive. He does not 
dispute that if the University followed its own regulations, 
it would provide him constitutionally adequate process. 
Rather, Alvin contends that regardless of the procedures 
laid out in the handbook, his experience with the University 
demonstrated that it was intransigent, and that it never 
intended to fairly consider his complaints. Hence, he 
argues, using the processes would have been futile. 
 
When access to procedure is absolutely blocked or there 
is evidence that the procedures are a sham, the plaintiff 
need not pursue them to state a due process claim. See 
Stauffer v. William Penn Sch. Dist., 829 F. Supp. 742, 749 
(E.D.Pa. 1993); Moran v. Burns, No. 92-1765, 1993 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 10365, *13 (D.N.J. July 26, 1993) (recognizing 
that a plaintiff could present evidence of futility); see also 
W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748, 756 (3d Cir. 1987) (discussing 
similar requirements when seeking injunctive relief under 
S 1983 and IDEA). However, since Alvin never invoked the 
second part of the processes available to him, which appear 
facially adequate, we will not hold that this step would have 
been unavailing (in procedure, if not in substance), absent 
concrete evidence supporting such a contention. 
 
We have previously encountered like cases, in which 
plaintiffs have attempted to make a procedural due process 
claim, charging that bias has infected a review of its 
deprivation, although they have not used all the procedures 
available to them. For example, in McDaniels v. Flick, 59 
F.3d 446, 460 (3d Cir. 1995), we stated that 
 
       a discharged employee cannot claim in federal court 
       that he has been denied due process because his 
       pretermination hearing was held by a biased individual 
       where he has not taken advantage of his right to a 
       post-deprivation hearing before an impartial tribunal 
       that can rectify any possible wrong committed by the 
       initial decisionmaker. 
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Likewise, in Dykes v. Southeastern Pennsylvania 
Transportation Authority, 68 F.3d 1564 (3d Cir. 1995), we 
held that a dismissed employee failed to state a claim for a 
due process violation after pursuing a three-level, 
apparently biased, grievance procedure, when he did not 
request arbitration, although arbitration was available to 
him. We concluded that his failure to pursue the 
arbitration available to him precluded his bringing a due 
process challenge even when the "plaintiff allege[d] that the 
defendants acted in concert to deprive him both of a 
meaningful hearing and of arbitration" because the 
"administrative process in place ha[d] incorporated 
safeguards adequate to resolve these allegations in a 
manner consistent with the demands of due process." Id. at 
1572. Likewise, in this case, if Alvin failed to use the post- 
deprivation procedures available to him, he cannot forego 
attempting to use those processes simply because he thinks 
that they will be followed in a biased manner. 
 
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Alvin, 
there is simply insufficient evidence that the formal hearing 
would not be held in a fair and impartial manner. For 
example, he has not brought forth evidence that he would 
not be able to use a lawyer, present evidence, or explain 
himself. The record supports his argument that the 
informal proceedings were painfully slow, and that several 
letters he wrote were not responded to, and even that 
several members of the UPitt faculty and administration 
were disposed against his claim. But as in Dykes , 68 F.3d 
at 1572, an allegation that initial stages of a process had 
been biased does not mean that the later processes will be 
biased as well. In McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 460, we observed 
that "[u]sually, an employment termination decision is 
made initially by the employee's direct supervisor or 
someone working in the same organization as the 
employee," and that individuals in such a position may well 
be influenced, or be alleged to be influenced, by "bias or 
improper motivation." Regardless, we held that such claims 
of bias do not give an employee license to conclude that the 
entire system is biased. See id. 
 
Therefore, while the fired professor in McDaniels wanted 
to prove that his pre-termination hearing was not impartial, 
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the presence of arbitration and other apparently adequate 
post-termination remedies foreclosed his ability to make a 
procedural due process claim. See id. at 460-61. The 
Constitution does not require perfection at every stage of a 
process; like the plaintiff in McDaniels, Alvin has not used 
all the processes available, and he cannot convert his 
difficulties with quickly triggering the informal process into 
a contention that the entire process, which he has not yet 
used, is biased. See id. 
 
C. The Conflict of Interest Claim 
 
Alvin also makes a distinct claim based on the alleged 
inadequacy of the process available to Alvin when Suzuki 
ordered him to stop all research on the ground that there 
was an apparent conflict between Alvin's commitments to 
PKI and the University. A review of the evidence reveals that 
this claim also fails due to Alvin's failure to complete the 
processes provided by the University. 
 
Alvin's correspondence with Maher in late 1995 and early 
1996 demonstrates that, contrary to Alvin's contentions, 
Maher was fairly responsive. While he did not give Alvin 
what he wanted, he engaged him and his concerns and 
triggered a review process. Moreover, Alvin's contention that 
by the end of 1995 the Provost's Office had simply stopped 
dealing with him is not supported. Rather, Alvin was 
indisputedly the party that ended the process when he 
precipitously wrote to Maher, informing him that he would 
be pursuing his complaints through litigation. There is no 
other way to read this letter. Furthermore, Alvin did not 
even attempt to pursue an appeal of the conflict of interest 
decision (or refusal to decide, as he characterizes it) 
through the grievance process provided in the Faculty 
Handbook. Therefore, even if we were to accept his 
argument that the Provost's office had failed him through 
direct review of Suzuki's decision, he was obligated to 
trigger the formal process before bringing this claim. See 
Dykes, 68 F.3d at 1571 (holding that failure of lower levels 
of process do not justify skipping secondary levels before 
filing a federal action).4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We do not hold that a party need wait forever before suing, but only 
that, if the process is moving forward, and the avenues of internal appeal 
have not been triggered, then a suit claiming inadequacy of procedural 
protection is premature. 
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D. Other Claims 
 
Alvin admittedly did not attempt to use the informal 
process for his other claims: (1) that he was denied 
secretarial support; (2) that he was treated unfairly in 
connection with his grant proposal; (3) that his 1993-94 or 
1994-95 annual review was biased; and (4) that his tenure 
was transferred from the School of Dental Medicine to the 
School of Pharmacy (a claim we consider separately, see 
Part IV, infra). He asserts that his experience had taught 
him that the grievance process was a sham, and that in 
such a circumstance, one need not go through a futile 
exercise in order to state a due process claim. However, as 
discussed above, he presents no evidence that the 
procedures are inadequate, and, for the reasons explained 
above, see Section III.A-C, supra, he cannot state a 
procedural due process claim with respect to these aspects 
of the case absent such evidence. 
 
IV. Pre-termination Claim Regarding Tenure Transfer 
 
Alvin's last claim is that he was denied constitutionally 
mandated notice and a hearing before his transfer of tenure 
from SPharm to the School of Dental Medicine. This is 
distinct from his other claims, in which his quarrel with the 
University concerns the adequacy of their post -termination 
procedures. 
 
A. 
 
Alvin submits that he did not receive any notice or 
hearing prior to being transferred, and the Constitution 
requires that he have these pre-deprivation procedures.5 
Unlike the other claims, a complete constitutional violation 
has (allegedly) already occurred; if the Constitution requires 
pre-termination procedures, the most thorough and fair 
post-termination hearing cannot undo the failure to provide 
such procedures. See Stana v. School Dist. of Pittsburgh, 
775 F.2d 122, 129 (3d Cir. 1985) (indicating that following 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We need not, and do not, decide whether there is a disputed issue of 
material fact regarding whether Alvin received notice because we 
conclude that even if he did not, notice was not required. 
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Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 
(1985), there can be no requirement to pursue post- 
deprivation remedies when pre-deprivation notice or 
hearing is required for due process). To determine whether 
and what sort of pre-deprivation hearing is required, we 
examine, and balance, three factors: 
 
       First, the private interest that will be affected by the 
       official action; second, the risk of an erroneous 
       deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
       used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
       substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
       Government's interest. 
 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). While, 
under this test, a public employee is generally entitled to 
notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to being 
deprived of his or her property interest in employment, see, 
e.g., McDaniels v. Flick, 59 F.3d 446, 456 (3d Cir. 1995), 
this rule is not absolute, see Gilbert v. Homar , 520 U.S. 
924, 929 (1997). The pre-termination hearing must be 
examined in light of the "the last factor in the Mathews 
balancing . . . the risk of erroneous deprivation and the 
likely value of any additional procedures." Id. at 933. In 
Codd v. Velgar, 429 U.S. 624 (1977), the Court concluded 
that a pre-termination hearing was not required when there 
was no underlying factual dispute to be hashed out in the 
hearing: "[I]f the hearing mandated by the Due Process 
Clause is to serve any useful purpose, there must be some 
factual dispute between an employer and a discharged 
employee which has some significant bearing on the 
employee's reputation." Id. at 627-28 (emphasis added). As 
in Codd, there was simply no factual dispute that a pre- 
deprivation notice or hearing could have addressed. Alvin's 
transfer was as part of a large and undifferentiated group-- 
all the SPharm faculty were transferred--and there were no 
factual disputes that could have been resolved at a hearing. 
 
Even Alvin's letters and complaint acknowledge that the 
argument about the transfer is an argument about 
University-wide policy--not a disagreement about 
accusations against Alvin. Therefore, the "risk of error," as 
it were, was nonexistent. In sum, while Alvin may be able 
to make out a breach of contract claim for the transfer, we 
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find that the absence of pre-deprivation notice or a hearing 
did not, in itself, violate his due process rights. 
 
V. PKI and PRD's Claims 
 
Leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so 
requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. Although refusals to grant 
leave to amend are reviewed for abuse of discretion, see 
Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 155 F.3d 644, 
654 (3d Cir. 1998), it is an abuse of discretion to deny leave 
to amend unless "plaintiff 's delay in seeking amendment is 
undue, made in bad faith, prejudicial to the opposing party, 
or [the amendment] fails to cure the jurisdictional defect," 
Berkshire Fashions, Inc. v. M.V. Hakusan II, 954 F.2d 874, 
886 (3d Cir. 1992); see also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 
182 (1962) (holding that it is abuse of discretion to deny 
leave to amend absent a clear or declared reason such as 
delay, bad faith, prejudice, or a repeated failure to cure a 
problem in the complaint); Boileau v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 
730 F.2d 929, 938 (3d Cir. 1984) (trial court abused 
discretion by refusing to permit plaintiff to amend 
complaint where no prejudice to defendant was alleged or 
proved). Leave to amend may be denied, however, if 
amendment would be futile. See Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 
180, 190 (3d Cir. 1998), rev'd on other grounds , 525 U.S. 
459 (1999). An amendment is futile if the amended 
complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See id. 
 
The plaintiffs contend: (1) that the District Court should 
have granted leave to amend PKI's complaint to clarify the 
basis of its claim that it had been independently harmed; 
and (2) that the court should have allowed PRD to be added 
as a party. We agree. There was no evidence of bad faith, 
delay, or prejudice, or any other reasons justifying the 
denial of leave to amend. In fact the court did not justify its 
denial of leave to amend for any of those reasons, but 
because the plaintiff 's amended complaint did not comport 
with the court's prior order about the scope of amendment. 
The court stated: "The amended complaint clearly fails to 
comply with the requirements I gave on August 15th at the 
time we had our last argument in this case. I'm going to 
grant the motion to strike the amended complaint," and 
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"you failed to follow the instructions that I gave on August 
15." When the plaintiffs objected, both to the refusal to 
allow amendment and the court's response, noting that a 
dismissal with prejudice would interfere with PKI's rights 
(given the statute of limitations), the court responded, not 
in Rule 15 terms, but in something more like Rule 16(b) 
terms,6 that it would be "easier to manage from the Court's 
point of view. We're not going to permit any further 
amendment to this complaint." 
 
As this excerpt makes clear, the record supports PKI's 
theory that the District Court refused the amendment 
because of case management concerns, both in terms of the 
course the case might follow, and a perceived need for 
fidelity to the court's prior management plan, which did not 
contemplate adding PRD as a party (and arguably included 
a clear order not to do so). But these reasons are not 
among those justifying a refusal of leave to amend. 
Moreover, PKI was dismissed with prejudice, which is a 
severe and disfavored remedy. See, e.g., Icon Group, Inc. v. 
Mahogony Run Dev. Corp., 829 F.2d 473, 477 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(holding that dismissal of a claim after the plaintiff made a 
good faith, but unsuccessful, effort to comply with an order 
to amend was inappropriate); Donnelly v. Johns-Manville 
Sales Corp., 677 F.2d 339, 342 (3d Cir. 1982). Cf. Estate of 
Leon Spear v. Commissioner of IRS, 41 F.3d 103, 111 (3d 
Cir. 1994) ("We apply a sliding scale--the harsher the 
sanction being imposed, the more the balance will have to 
be against the party being sanctioned to justify the 
sanction."). 
 
The defendants argue that PKI's dismissal should be 
upheld because the unfair competition claims could only 
have affected PRD, and hence PKI cannot be the real party 
in interest. Essentially, they are invoking the rule that, if 
amendment would be futile, the court does not abuse its 
discretion in denying leave to amend. See Smith , 139 F.3d 
at 190. PKI, the defendants submit, was filing not on its 
own behalf, but as a limited partner of PRD. Under 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We refer to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b), which sets forth the 
District Court's general case management power, establishing time limits 
for filing motions, making amendments, and joining parties, inter alia. 
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Pennsylvania law, a limited partner loses the right to 
conduct business in exchange for limited liability, and may 
not sue for harms to the partnership. See In re Estate of 
Hall, 535 A.2d 47, 56 (Pa. 1987); Kenworthy v. Hargrove, 
855 F. Supp. 101, 104 (E.D. Pa. 1994). Alvin himself has 
admitted that PKI had not engaged in business activity for 
some time (it has not employed anyone since 1995), and 
that all the lab employees work for PRD. This is in contrast 
to PRD, which regularly engages in business. 
 
However, the plaintiffs contend that the harm to PKI 
occurred prior to the creation of PRD, and in fact led to the 
creation of PRD. In particular, they allege that unfair 
competition led PKI to make arrangements with CPF and 
PRD; that the sale and marketing of PKI's technical 
products was diminished; and that it could not engage in 
its former operations. The proposed amended complaint 
stated that PKI had engaged in independent business 
through 1991, and continued to operate independently of 
PRD to the date of the complaint. Regardless of the 
substantive validity of the claims, PKI has at least alleged 
sufficient facts that would render it a real party in interest. 
 
This leads to the question whether PKI has stated a claim 
that could survive a 12(b)(6) motion. See Smith , 139 F.3d at 
190. This is a legitimate question, and if the court had 
made a legally correct determination that PKI has not 
stated a viable claim, we would uphold its decision to 
refuse to allow PKI to amend its complaint. However, 
nothing in the record suggests that the court even 
considered whether PKI stated a viable claim by way of its 
amended allegations, and the parties, on appeal, merely 
argue about whether PKI is a real party in interest. 
Therefore, because PKI's proposed amended complaint 
colorably alleges specific harm to it, we conclude that the 
court abused its discretion when it dismissed PKI's claims 
with prejudice. Likewise, the District Court abused its 
discretion in denying the motion to amend the complaint to 
add PRD. There was no evidence of bad faith, delay or 
prejudice, and there is no indication in the record that the 
District Court even considered whether the addition would 
be futile. Rather, the record supports PRD's theory that the 
court refused to allow that amendment too for case 
management purposes. 
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For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District 
Court dismissing PKI, refusing to allow an amendment of 
the complaint, and refusing to allow an amendment adding 
PRD as a party will be vacated, and the claims remanded 
to the District Court for further proceedings. The court can 
consider the PRD and PKI claims on remand. 
 
VI. 
 
In sum, we will affirm the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment for the defendants on Alvin's claims 
and the dismissal, without prejudice, of his accompanying 
state law claims.7 We will also reverse the dismissal, with 
prejudice, of the PKI claims, and the refusal to amend the 
complaint to add PRD, and will remand the case to the 
District Court for further proceedings regarding those 
claims. Parties to bear their own costs. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Alvin also claims that he was deprived of a liberty interest without 
due 
process of law. We affirm the District Court's disposal of this claim for 
the reasons set forth in the District Court's opinion. 
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